Management And Accounting Web

Executive Compensation Bibliography

Provided by James R. Martin, Ph.D., CMA
Professor Emeritus, University of South Florida

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Abdel-Khalik, A. R., C. Chi and D. Ghicas. 1987. Rationality of executive compensation schemes and real accounting changes. Contemporary Accounting Research 4(1): 32-60.

Addy, N. and T. Yoder. 2011. The decision to adopt a clawback provision. The CPA Journal (January): 58-63. (Note: Clawbacks authorize companies to recoup compensation from executives when there are financial restatements, or there has been executive misbehavior).

Antle, R. and A. Smith. 1985. Measuring executive compensation: Methods and an application. Journal of Accounting Research (Spring): 296-325. (JSTOR link).

Baber, W. R., S. Kang, and K. R. Kumar. 1998. Accounting earnings and executive compensation: The role of earnings persistence. Journal of Accounting and Economics (27 May): 169-193.

Baber, W. R., S. Kang and K. R. Kumar. 1999. The explanatory power of earnings levels vs. earnings changes in the context of executive compensation. The Accounting Review (October): 459-472. (JSTOR link).

Baber, W. R., S. N. Janakiraman and S. Kang. 1996. Investment opportunities and the structure of executive compensation. Journal of Accounting and Economics (June): 297-318.

Baker, G. P. 1987. Discussion of an analysis of the use of accounting and market measures of performance in executive compensation contracts. Journal of Accounting Research (Studies on Stewardship Uses of Accounting Information): 126-129. (JSTOR link).

Bao, D., S. Y. K. Fung and L. Su. 2018. Can shareholders be at rest after adopting clawback provisions? Evidence from stock price crash risk. Contemporary Accounting Research 35(3): 1578-1615.

Barlas, S. 2015. More time to pursue civil penalties, and pushback on clawback reporting proposal. Strategic Finance (November): 13.

Barlas, S. 2016. SEC takes next step on S-K, and Executive compensation proposal satisfies no one. Strategic Finance (November): 13.

Beatty, R. P. and E. J. Zajac. 1994.Managerial incentives, monitoring, and risk bearing: A study of executive compensation, ownership, and board structure in initial public offerings. Administrative Science Quarterly 39(2): 313-335. (JSTOR link).

Beaumont, S. et. al. 2016. Comments on Shan and Walter: Towards a set of design principles for executive compensation contracts. Abacus 52(4): 685-771.

Bebchuk, L. and J. M. Fried. 2004. Pay without Performance: The Unfulfilled Promise of Executive Compensation. Harvard University Press.

Bettis, J. C., J. Bizjak, J. L. Coles and S. Kalpathy. 2018. Performance-vesting provisions in executive compensation. Journal of Accounting and Economics (August): 194-221.

Blazovich, J. L., G. R. Huston and J. M. Huston. 2014. Creating an executive compensation plan: A corporate tax planning case. Issues in Accounting Education (November): 1-8.

Brown, K. E. and J. Lim. 2012. The effect of internal control deficiencies on the usefulness of earnings in executive compensation. Advances in Accounting: Incorporating Advances in International Accounting 28(1): 75-87.

Carter, M. E. 2011. Executive Compensation and Financial Accounting, Foundations and TrendsĀ® in Accounting Vol. 4 by David Aboody, Ron Kasznik. The Accounting Review (March): 735-738.

Chan, L. H., K. C. W. Chen, T. Chen and Y. Yu. 2012. The effects of firm-initiated clawback provisions on earnings quality and auditor behavior. Journal of Accounting and Economics (October-December): 180-196.

Charnes, A., W. W. Cooper and R. O. Ferguson. 1955. Optimal estimation of executive compensation by linear programming. Management Science (January): 138-151. (JSTOR link).

Chen, K. C. W. and F. Tang. 2017. Post-IFRS revaluation adjustments and executive compensation. Contemporary Accounting Research 34(2): 1210-1231.

Coughlan, A. T. and R. M. Schmidt. 1985. Executive compensation, management turnover, and firm performance: An empirical investigation. Journal of Accounting and Economics (April): 43-66.

Defeo, V. J., R. A. Lambert and D. F. Larcker. 1989. The executive compensation effects of equity-for-debt swaps. The Accounting Review (April): 201-227. (JSTOR link).

DeHaan, E., F. Hodge and T. Shevlin. 2013. Does voluntary adoption of a clawback provision improve financial reporting quality? Contemporary Accounting Research 30(3): 1027-1062.

Denis, D. J. and J. Xu. 2013. Insider trading restrictions and top executive compensation. Journal of Accounting and Economics (July): 91-112.

Denis, D. K. 2012. Mandatory clawback provisions, information disclosure, and the regulation of securities markets. Journal of Accounting and Economics (October-December): 197-200.

Elson, C. 2003. What's wrong with executive compensation? Harvard Business Review (January): 68-77.

Erkens, M. H. R., Y. Gan and B. B. Yurtoglu. 2018. Not all clawbacks are the same: Consequences of strong versus weak clawback provisions. Journal of Accounting and Economics (August): 291-317.

Ferri, F., R. Zheng and Y. Zou. 2018. Uncertainty about managers' reporting objectives and investors' response to earnings reports: Evidence from 2006 executive compensation disclosures. Journal of Accounting and Economics (November-December): 339-365.

Fleming, A. S. 2008. Group decision-making and leadership: An experimental examination in an executive compensation scenario. Advances in Management Accounting (17): 113-149.

Gao, H., J. Luo and T. Tang. 2015. Effects of managerial labor market on executive compensation: Evidence from job-hopping. Journal of Accounting and Economics (April-May): 203-220.

Gomez-Mejia, L. R., H. Tosi and T. Hinkin. 1987. Managerial control, performance, and executive compensation. The Academy of Management Journal 30(1): 51-70. (JSTOR link).

Gomez-Mejia, L. R., M. Larraza-Kintana and M. Makri. 2003. The determinants of executive compensation in family-controlled public corporations. The Academy of Management Journal 46(2): 226-237. (JSTOR link).

Gong, G., L. Y. Li and J. Y. Shin. 2011. Relative performance evaluation and related peer groups in executive compensation contracts. The Accounting Review (May): 1007-1043.

Gong, J. J. 2011. Examining shareholder value creation over CEO tenure: A new approach to testing effectiveness of executive compensation. Journal of Management Accounting Research (23): 1-28.

Harris, D. G. and J. R. Livingstone. 2002. Federal tax legislation as an implicit contracting cost benchmark: The definition of excessive executive compensation. The Accounting Review (October): 997-1018. (JSTOR link).

Hirsch, B., B. E. Reichert and M. Sohn. 2017. The impact of clawback provisions on information processing and investment behaviour. Management Accounting Research (December): 1-11.

Hoffman, W. H. Jr. 1961. Executive compensation - Are you keeping in style or counting the costs? N.A.A. Bulletin (January): 15-23.

Holthausen, R. W., D. F. Larcker and R. G. Sloan. 1995. Business unit innovation and the structure of executive compensation. Journal of Accounting and Economics (March-May): 279-313.

Jayaraman, S. and T. T. Milbourn. 2012. The role of stock liquidity in executive compensation. The Accounting Review (March): 537-563.

Jongjaroenkamol, P. and V. Laux. 2017. Insider versus outsider CEOs, executive compensation, and accounting manipulation. Journal of Accounting and Economics (April-May): 253-261.

Kerr, J. L. and L. Kren. 1992. Effect of relative decision monitoring on chief executive compensation. The Academy of Management Journal 35(2): 370-397. (JSTOR link).

Kim, S. and J. Y. Shin. 2017. Executive bonus target ratcheting: Evidence from the new executive compensation disclosures rules. Contemporary Accounting Research 34(4): 1843-1879.

Kren, L. 2001. The relation between chief executive compensation and financial performance: The information effects of diversification. Advances in Management Accounting (10): 141-169.

Lambert, R. A. and D. F. Larcker. 1987. An analysis of the use of accounting and market measures of performance in executive compensation contracts. Journal of Accounting Research (Studies on Stewardship Uses of Accounting Information): 85-125. (JSTOR link).

Lambert, R. A., D. F. Larcker and R. E. Verrecchia. 1991. Portfolio considerations in valuing executive compensation. Journal of Accounting Research (Spring): 129-149. (JSTOR link).

Lanen, W. N. and D. F. Larcker. 1992. Executive compensation contract adoption in the electric utility industry. Journal of Accounting Research (Spring): 70-93. (JSTOR link).

Lewellen, W., C. Loderer and K. Martin. 1987. Executive compensation and executive incentive problems: An empirical analysis. Journal of Accounting and Economics (December): 287-310.

Liu, Y., H. Gan and K. Karim. 2018. The effectiveness of clawback adoptions in mitigating over-investments - Does board governance play a role? Advances in Accounting: Incorporating Advances in International Accounting (40): 61-75.

Lo, K. 2003. Economic consequences of regulated changes in disclosure: The case of executive compensation. Journal of Accounting and Economics (August): 285-314.

Natarajan, R. 1996. Stewardship value of earnings components: Additional evidence on the determinants of executive compensation. The Accounting Review (January): 1-22. (JSTOR link).

Ortiz-Molina, H. 2007. Executive compensation and capital structure: The effects of convertible debt and straight debt on CEO pay. Journal of Accounting and Economics (March): 69-93.

Ozkan, N., Z. Singer and H. You. 2012. Mandatory IFRS adoption and the contractual usefulness of accounting information in executive compensation. Journal of Accounting Research (September): 1077-1107.

Panitz, P. G. and P. Bonner. 2009. Executive compensation: What's reasonable? Journal of Accountancy (June): 56-61.

Roulstone, D. T. 2003. The relation between insider-trading restrictions and executive compensation. Journal of Accounting Research (June): 525-551. (JSTOR link).

Shan, Y. and T. Walter. 2016. Towards a set of design principles for executive compensation contracts. Abacus 52(4): 619-684.

Shim, E. D. and E. Kim. 2015. An empirical examination of the relationship between top executive compensation and firm performance in the post Sarbanes-Oxley period. Advances in Management Accounting (25): 207-228.

Shim, E. D., J. Lee and T. Corrigan. 1999. An empirical examination of top executive compensation and economic performance in financial service firms. Advances in Management Accounting (8): 225-237.

Sloan, R. G. 1993. Accounting earnings and top executive compensation. Journal of Accounting and Economics (January-July): 55-100.

Solstad, H. M. 1955. Executive compensation - A review of considerations. N.A.C.A. Bulletin (January): 729-734.

Stathopoulos, K. S. Espenlaub and M. Walker. 2004. U.K. executive compensation practices: New economy versus old economy. Journal of Management Accounting Research (16): 57-92.

Tehranian, H. and J. F. Waegelein. 1985. Market reaction to short-term executive compensation plan adoption. Journal of Accounting and Economics (April): 131-144.

Wasserman, N. 2006. Stewards, agents, and the founder discount: Executive compensation in new ventures. The Academy of Management Journal 49(5): 960-976. (JSTOR link).

Weiss, D. 2011. Discussion of: Examining shareholder value creation over CEO tenure: A new approach to testing effectiveness of executive compensation. Journal of Management Accounting Research (23): 29-36.

Young, S. and J. Yang. 2011. Stock repurchases and executive compensation contract design: The role of earnings per share performance conditions. The Accounting Review (March): 703-733.

Zajac, E. J. and J. D. Westphal. 1995. Accounting for the explanations of CEO compensation: Substance and symbolism. Administrative Science Quarterly 40(2): 283-308. (JSTOR link).